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THE DILEMMAS OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

DOCTOR JOHN R. THOMAS

long-standing historic aspirations. Clearly,
too, this gain in an area vital to US interests
cannot be ignored or underestimated in the
hope that it will fade away. Yet, without
discounting them, Soviet activities should not
evoke a hysterical reaction in the West. These
recent Soviet successes are balanced by the
dilemmas and the reservations within the
Soviet leadership to Soviet policy in the
Middle East arising from those dilemmas. We
have in the past overestimated Soviet
capabilities, with the result that the US has
often been inhibited in taking appropriate
measures in its own self-interest. Many of the
Soviet problems and dilemmas in the Middle
East are already in evidence and others are
foreshadowed by developments in the area to
date; indeed, many of these dilemmas are
perceived by some Soviet leaders even today,
as will be indicated later.
Moreover, the Soviet dilemmas, specifically
in the Middle East, are only one group of a
whole array of external political-military
problems facing the Soviets. These other
major problems must be noted, even if only
briefly, because they impinge directly on the
Soviet freedom of action in the Middle East,
set limits on future Soviet "successes" in the
area and may in the extreme even be
responsible for turning the current apparent
or real successes into long-term failures.
In the early post-World War I I days
nationalism in the form of anti-colonialism
was directed against the West; this enabled the
Soviets to capitalize on it in many
underdeveloped areas, including the Middle
East, by establishing their presence as a
"fresh, new face." This face has already worn
off in some developing countries as they come
to see Soviet presence and objectives as having
much of what was ascribed to Western
colonialism. Most relevantly in the Middle
East case, this includes Soviet economic
exploitation represented by such measures as

(What are the alternatives which confront
Soviet leaders in relation to the type of
support to be given to certain Arab
countries? What are the implications for
the West?)

CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET ACTIONS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The treaty of friendship and cooperation
concluded by the Soviet Union and the UAR
this spring posits on the surface a long term
Soviet presence in the UAR. Yet precisely
because the agreement is intended to be in
force for the next 15 years, it is appropriate
to put in a longer perspective the seemingly
enhanced Soviet position in the UAR
represented by the treaty.
Without question, Soviet penetration into
the Middle East, begun in the mid-50's under
Khrushchev and now continuing with greater
force under his successors, should be scored as
a clear gain for the Soviets in an area where
both their influence and presence had been
a b s e n t before World War II, despite
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buying Egyptian cotton at low prices and
reselling it on the world market at higher
prices and pocketing the difference.
The broader context of politico-military
problems affecting Soviet policy in the Middle
East now and limiting its future success
includes a combination of massive old and
new strategic problems, some of which the US
does not confront. First, the Soviets face a
t r a d i t i o n a l c o n t i n e n t a l rival--West
Germany whose strength (in their view) is
likely to be increased in the future by
possession of nuclear weapons and missiles.
But even in the worst case of national
acquisition of nuclear-missile armaments,
West Germany would offer relatively little
concern to the Soviets if, alone and unaided,
it posed the only threat. They could handle
such a threat by their superior ground forces,
nuclear-missile capabilities, and the greater
resources available t o them in the post-World
War II period.
But the potential threat posed by Red
China has added another dimension to Soviet
strategic problems. With the defeat of Japan
in 1945 and the Communist victory in China
in 1949, the Soviets assumed that they had
permanently solved the two-front threat
posed before World War II by Germany and
Japan. Their contingency planning for the
future must now assume a hostile Red China,
either acting alone or in implicit collusion
with West Germany. Indeed, the Soviets
already view the two as possible anti-Soviet
allies insofar as both have designs on
Soviet-held territory.
Beyond China, Japan potentially can
resurrect its challenge to the Soviets in Asia.
It has greater economic potential than China
t o day to develop large nuclear-missile
capabilities. Politically, Japan has reasons to
challenge the Soviets because of her territorial
loss to the Soviets, currently centered on the
budding Japanese demands for the return of
the Soviet-held northern islands.
In addition to the traditional Eurasian
threat, the US has added an entirely new
dimension to postwar Soviet strategic
problems. In Soviet eyes, the US challenge
differs from any Eurasian threat on three
counts: (a) as a non-Eurasian power the US is

beyond the reach of Soviet ground forces,
unless the Soviets succeed in establishing a
presence on the North American continent
similar to that of the US in Europe; (b) the
US still has the overall edge in the
nuclear-missile arsenal if the MIRV is taken
into account; and (c) most important, the US
has the resources to enlarge its military
capabilities that the Soviets cannot hope to
match in the foreseeable future unless the US
deliberately permits them to do s o .
C o n s e q u e n t l y , a possible US-USSR
confrontation in a general war poses almost
insoluble problems for the Soviets. A German
attack on the Soviet Union could at least be
blunted by the traditional Russian strategy of
trading space for time, but a US missile attack
that would eliminate the need to invade
Soviet territory in order to threaten Soviet
political centers cannot be met by the
space-for-time solution.
The requirements of support of friendly
governments outside the Soviet Bloc area or,
to show the flag around the globe, confront
the Soviet Union with another new postwar
strategic problem: how to project its military
power beyond its periphery. As in the case of
missile defense to meet the US threat, a
different capability than that represented by
traditional ground forces is required. The
Soviets are trying to solve the problem by
developing airlift and sealift capabilities as
well as training amphibious and airborne
forces. But this task, like missile defense, adds
another burden to the already overburdened
Soviet economy.
In sum, the Soviets are confronted by the
gigantic problem of developing separate and
relatively noninterchangeable capabilities to
counter a missile attack from the US, to meet
a ground attack on the Eurasian continent
from either or both the East and West, and to
support or fight in non-peripheral national
liberation wars. Given the limitation on their
resources and the rising demands of domestic
needs, the Soviets cannot hope to acquire
simultaneously in the near future the
capabilities adequate to meet all the strategic
threats and requirements. Should they opt for
such a solution, it could only be realized--if at
all--at the expense of other important
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about Nasser was the latter's promotion of
Egyptian nationalism and Pan-Arab unity.
Even Khrushchev himself was angered during
a visit to Cairo in 1964 by Nasser's boosting
of Egypt as the leader of the Pan-Arab
movement in the Middle East and his playing
down of Soviet aid. On that occasion,
Khrushchev vocally objected that Egypt's
Pan-Arab aspirations would leave out the
Russians. Instead, he argued that Nasser's
policy should be anti-imperialist and
anti-Western, a policy which would place the
Soviets squarely in the Arab camp. The Soviet
reservations about any moves in the direction
of Arab unity have carried over into the
current leadership. In a speech in Soviet
Georgia this spring, Brezhnev tactfully gave
equal stress to efforts of individual Arab
states to unite "patriotic, progressive forces"
in a national context at a time when the new
Tripartite Federation (Egypt, Libya, and
Syria) is due to become effective in
September. It should be noted that
Brezhnev's open refusal to bless the
Federation coincided with the removal of Ali
Sabry, the UAR Vice-President, for his
opposition to this scheme.
Even more than for ideological reasons the
objections of the Soviet elite to aiding the
UAR have been based on pragmatic grounds
of cost effectiveness and material return to
the Soviets. It is in this context that the
former Party Presidium member Saburov
objected to Soviet aid to Nasser in
Khrushchev's days, fearing that it would be
dissipated without effective return to the
Soviets. For opposing Khrushchev's foreign
aid policy, Saburov was attacked at the 21st
Party Congress in January 1959 and demoted
from his high Party and governmental posts.
But the reservations on the cost side were not
eliminated with his removal. And after
Khrushchev's downfall, the opposition
extended to some Soviet military who
objected to shipping arms to UAR after its
disastrous performance in the 1967 six-day
war.*

priorities such as long-term economic
growth.*
All these strategic problems provide
constraints that have and will continue to set
limits on Soviet freedom of action in the
Middle East. Indeed, some of the Soviet
leaders were aware of these constraints from
t h e very beginning of t h e Soviet
"leap-frogging" into the area in the
mid-Fifties under Khrushchev's leadership.
This led them to have reservations about, and
in some cases to openly oppose, the Soviet
policy in that area. In this connection, we
should recall some little-heralded history of
Soviet policy in the Middle East. Even the
initial Soviet involvement in the Middle
East-triggered by Khrushchev in 1955 via
Soviet arms shipments and economic
assistance to Egypt (focused in particular on
helping the Egyptians build the Aswan
Dam)-met with high level internal opposition.
This resistance occurred on ideological and
pragmatic grounds.
OPPOSITION TO SUPPORT
WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION

Opposition within the Soviet Union to the
activist Middle Eastern policy initiated by
Khrushchev arose in 1955 on ideological
grounds; the point was raised that aid given to
a non-Communist leader such as Nasser could
and should have been better spent on
Communist allies. The specific objection to
helping Nasser was intensified by the fact that
Nasser s o repressed t h e Egyptian
C o m m u n i s t s — b y jailing th e m — t h a t
Khrushchev was led to lodge an open protest
in 1959. He was rebuffed by Nasser with a
reminder that what the latter did with the
Egyptian Communists was an internal affair,
brooking no Soviet meddling.
Adding fuel to internal Soviet reservations
*For a more detailed examination of the many
postwar strategic and foreign policy problems and
dilemmas facing the Soviet leadership which offset
Soviet gains and inhibit Soviet freedom of action
abroad see John R. Thomas, "Soviet Foreign Policy
and Conflict Within Political and Military
Leadership," RAC-P-61, Research Analysis
Corporation, McLean, Virginia, Sep 70.

*The reservations of the Soviet military about
Soviet policy toward the UAR are discussed later in
this paper.
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ORDNANCE M A G A Z l N E

The Soviet SCARP SS-9 Missile. Can deliver three 5-megaton warheads to a range of more than
5,000 nautical miles. Can be used also in fractional orbit bombardment system(IOBS).

The foregoing is illustrative of the record of
opposition or reservations even in the context
of earlier indirect Soviet involvement in the
Middle East. These reservations were
intensified by the subsequent direct and
greater Soviet involvement in the UAR. For
now the Soviets face in the Middle East what
can be called "the proxy quandary": the
Soviets want an ally in the Middle East who
can effectively fight his own battles, requiring
only material aid and obviating the need for
direct Soviet involvement. Lacking such an
ally, the Soviets may be confronted in
another Arab-Israeli conflict with the choice
of still another costly political abstention or
direct intervention at the risk of a military
confrontation with the US. The Soviets have
been put into this quandary as a result of the
most important consequence of the six-day
war in 1967: the clear-cut Israeli victory
proved, beyond any shadow of a doubt, the
ineffectiveness of the United Arab Republic
(UAR) as an ally that could in the short run
win another conflict and obviate the need for
direct Soviet involvement in the Middle East.
In the face of such a quandary, some in the
Soviet elite, particularly among the military,

might be driven to oppose the political
leadership if the latter chooses to intervene
directly and massively in another Arab-Israeli
war. Even in 1967 the Soviet military
undoubtedly had reservations about those
political leaders advocating direct Soviet
military intervention to bail out the Egyptians
in the six-day war. One of these leaders was,
for example, the then Moscow party
apparatus secretary, Yegorychev. (As head of
the most important party machinery in the
Soviet Union—therefore a key political figure,
who visited Cairo in April 1967 shortly before
the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict—he
had a major voice in Soviet policy making.)
Yegorychev was overruled (and subsequently
fired from his post and demoted to the post
of ambassador to Denmark) by other Soviet
political leaders who, although seeking an
expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle
East, undoubtedly wanted to avoid direct
Soviet involvement a t that time. Premier
Kosygin signaled this caution at the outbreak
of the six-day war when he made it clear to
President Johnson that the Soviet Union
intended to abstain from that conflict. But
even though Kosygin's action reflected the
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by the fact that he led the criticism of other
unwise moves of the political leadership such
as Khrushchev's "adventurism" in the 1962
Cuban missile crisis. That crisis, in the view of
Zakharov and other Soviet military, placed
the Soviets in an untenable military situation:
to go to the brink with the US in the face of
the then overall US strategic superiority and
tactical advantage in the Caribbean; here, the
Soviets lacked even the tactical advantage
they have enjoyed in past Berlin crises,
represented by the 20 Soviet divisions around
Berlin.* Given Zakharov's earlier attack on
Khrushchev's "adventurism" that resulted in
his dismissal as Chief of Staff in 1963, it can
be surmised that Zakharov may have had
similar r e s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t the new
adventurism of Khrushchev's successors in the
Middle East (even though they reappointed
him to his former post after Khrushchev's
downfall). This new adventurism resulted not
only in the Egyptian debacle of 1967 but in
the subsequent Egyptian loss of weapons
supplied by the Soviets after the six-day war
such as the spectacular Israeli capture intact
of a seven-ton radar component of an
anti-aircraft missile (SAM-2) system in
December 1969.
The reservations of some Soviet military
about the eventual success of the political
leadership's Middle East policy stem from the
Soviet appraisal of the Egyptian debacle. In
the wake of the six-day war in 1967, the
Soviet military and political press indicated
that in the short run the Egyptian military
would be ineffective because:

opinion of the majority of the top political
leaders against one extreme of direct Soviet
involvement, this group at the same time
overruled the probable opposition of some
Soviet military by ordering the replacement
of the equipment lost by the Egyptians in the
1967 fiasco with the latest Soviet weaponry.
There are precedents for the negative
reaction of the Soviet military to placing the
latest Soviet weaponry beyond Soviet borders
because of the danger that these would fall
into unfriendly hands or would promote a
militarily untenable situation. In the spring of
1962-when Khrushchev made the decision to
begin diverting missiles for emplacement in
Cuba-Marshal Moskalenko, then commander
of strategic missile forces, and Marshal
Golikov, then head of the Soviet Army's Main
Political Administration, were removed and
replaced by Marshal Biryuzov and General
Yepishev, respectively, men more amenable to
Khrushchev's views. Moskalenko and Golikov
were removed, among other reasons, for
opposing the Khrushchev decision. From their
viewpoint, such a move put the latest
weapons, which the Soviet military have
traditionally been anxious to shield from
Western examination, in the US backyard
where they were subject to possible US
capture or destruction.*
Similarly, in the wake of the Egyptian
defeat in the six-day war, some Soviet
military must undoubtedly have opposed
shipping their latest weapons to the Middle
East where these could be captured by the
Israelis or could otherwise fall into Western
hands. The current Chief of Staff, Marshal
Zakharov, may have headed this opposition.
During an inspection trip to Egypt in the
wake of the 1967 conflict, he saw first hand
the extent of the Egyptian loss of the latest
Soviet equipment. As a result, he must
undoubtedly have had objections to the
Soviets "throwing good money after bad."
His reservations might have been reinforced

( 1 ) T h e E g y p t i a n s o l d i e r s were
s e m i - l i t e r a t e and therefore technically
incapable of handling the latest modern
weapons turned over to Egypt by the Soviets;
( 2 ) The Egyptian officer corps was
incompetent, composed, as it still was,

*In reacting negatively to the "adventurism" in
the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet military were not
criticizing Khrushchev's backing down during the
missile crisis but rather the placement of Soviet
missiles in Cuba in the first place, given their
vulnerability to US action and in the face of US
strategic and tactical superiority.

*For a discussion of Moskalenko's and Golikov's
opposition to the Cuban missile emplacement, see
Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, Viking Press, New
York, 1969, pp. 236-39.
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m i g h t nevertheless pose the following
questions as illustrative of the chain of events
that give rise to the reservations of the Soviet
m i l i t a r y a b o u t heavier, direct Soviet
involvement in the Arab-Israeli imbroglio. If
beyond the single and unacknowledged
incident in the summer of 1970, the Israeli
pilots began to shoot down Soviet pilots with
accompanying widespread publicity, could
the Soviets withstand the resultant political
embarrassment? If not, would the Soviets, in
accordance with their tradition of applying
overwhelming numerical superiority against a
foe, begin to fly jets in massive numbers in
order to overwhelm the numerically small
Israeli air force? And if the Soviets intervened
on such a scale, would this in turn risk a US
military reaction to such an intervention?
Such a chain of events undoubtedly underlies
much of the reservations of some Soviet
military, such as Marshal Zakaharov. The
latter has had to plan for contingencies,
including the Cuban missile crisis, and has in
t h e p a s t e x p r e s s e d views o n t h e
unpredictability of a conflict situation. (It
should be noted that the same concern over
the unpredictability of developments, once a
military conflict breaks out, applies t o Soviet
views on the feasibility of limited war
between the US and the Soviet Union,
particularly in Europe. Many Soviet military
question whether any conflict involving the
US and the Soviet Union directly would not
escalate to general war.)
In sum, the military have had, and
u n d o u b t e d l y will continue to have,
reservations about the massive re-supply of
the UAR as long as the weaknesses of the
Egyptian military and political leaders
identified by the Soviet military have not
been corrected. Their reservations obviously
will be reduced to the degree they are given
direct control over the military weapons they
are ordered to position i n Egypt. But unless
this is accompanied further by direct Soviet
control over Egyptian military actions against
the Israelis, instead of such actions being left
in the hands of an unpredictable or unreliable
Egyptian leadership, the increasing Soviet
presence in the Middle East will not eliminate
the reservations of the Soviet military about

primarily of the "decadent" bourgeois class.*
The foregoing Soviet appraisal suggested by
implication that because time was needed to
cure the two problems noted above, it would
be wasteful and counter-productive in the
short run to squander any additional modern
military equipment on the UAR. This
provides another basis for the earlier inference
that Marshal Zakharov and others involved in
the post six-day war inspection trip to Cairo
probably had reservations about replacing the
equipment after the June 1967 war. The
Egyptian loss of latest Soviet equipment to
the Israelis must have served only to reinforce
those doubts.
The misgivings of the Soviet military about
the risks of war in the Middle East can be
inferred additionally from their warnings to
the Israelis against creating the dangers of a
wider conflict. This may be interpreted as an
indication that the Soviet military is trying to
head off the Israelis from creating a situation
(such as demonstrating Egyptian ineptitude)
which may force the Soviets to become
directly involved to maintain their prestige or
for other reasons.
The expanding presence of the Soviets in
the Middle East increases the possibility of an
Israeli blow to Soviet prestige that could
trigger their reaction with a corresponding
risk of a US-Soviet confrontation. For
example, the Soviets would be profoundly
embarrassed if their pilots were being lost in
numerous combat missions against t h e
Israelis. This looms as a distinct possibility
because the latter have had extensive combat
experience and are widely recognized as high
quality pilots who could take a heavy toll of
the Soviet adversary. By contrast, most of the
current generation of Soviet pilots have had
no combat experience.
With full awareness of the fluidity of the
current situation in the Middle East, one
*For an initial Soviet critique of the Egyptian
"military bourgeoise," see I. P. Belyaev and Y. M.
Primakov in Za Rubezhom, 30 June 1967. For a later
critique in the same vein, see G. I. Mirskii, Armiya I
Politika V Stranakh Azii I Afriky (Army and Politics
in Countries of Asia and Africa), Nauka Publishing
House, Moscow, 1970, pp. 87-95.
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significant change in the US-Soviet strategic
balance occuring since the Middle East crisis
in 1967. And equally noteworthy was the fact
that the Soviets openly acknowledged their
attempts to "reason" with the Syrians. In past
crises and in the face of a much greater Soviet
strategic disadvantage vis-a-vis the US, the
Soviets covered their retreat from a possible
confrontation with the US by blustering
threats to assist the Arabs, in the hope that
such threats would deter US action in the
Middle East. This was the Soviet calculation,
for example, in the Syrian-Turkish crisis of
1957 and the Lebanese crisis of 1958. The
display by the Soviets of even greater caution
i n the later Jordanian crisis indicates
continuing recognition of their dilemmas in
the Middle East and suggests a more sober
attitude towards a possible confrontation
with the US than was displayed by
Khrushchev in his "war of words."
The Soviet dilemmas arising from the
Arab-Israeli tensions are likely to be
compounded by other problems. Of these, the
major one is the instability of the Arab
regimes, affecting Syria in the past and now
seemingly spreading to the UAR as
represented by a purge last spring of Ali
Sabry. For even though Sadat won on this
occasion, the mold of stability achieved under
Nasser since the early 1950's has been
weakened and may be broken in the future.
At the same time, the purge of Sabry has
scuttled Soviet hopes, at least for the present,
that the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) could-as
the sole legal party--be infiltrated and taken
over by pro-Soviet forces such as the
Sabry-led faction to make it another
instrument for exerting pressure on Sadat, in
addition to leverage provided by direct aid on
state-to-state level. (To this end the Soviets
had been pressing for UAR internal political
"reform" including the creation of a more
disciplined party within a "transformed" ASU
led by someone like Sabry.) After Sabry's
purge, Sadat initiated a housecleaning in ASU
to free his internal power base of pro-Soviet
agents. This will limit the Soviet ability to
control Sadat and influence events in the
Middle East. It will also leave Sadat or others
of his persuasion free to turn to the West and

the risks that direct and massive Soviet
i n v o l v e m e n t i n renewed
large-scale
Arab-Israeli conflict would entail in terms of a
possible confrontation with the US.*
THE QUANDARY

Aside from the risk of a military
confrontation with the US, the most
important reason for the Soviet military to
oppose direct military involvement in an
Arab-Israeli conflict relates to the fact that
any such involvement in the Middle East
would divert Soviet strength and attention
from areas of higher priority such as Europe
and the China border.
The Soviet concern over Middle East
developments represented by the proxy
quandary was most recently reflected in
Soviet behavior in the Jordanian crisis of
S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 0 . C o n f r o n t e d by
ineffectiveness of an invading Syrian tank
force, the Soviets openly let it be known that
they were in touch with the Syrians, clearly in
order to restrain the latter from deeper
involvement which could have led to an even
greater Soviet dilemma: t o rescue the Syrians
from defeat if the US and Israelis had acted
on their warnings that they would intervene if
the Syrian forces did not return home. By
their efforts vis-a-vis the Syrians in not letting
the situation reach this point, the Soviets
made clear that they were ready neither to
bail the Syrians out of trouble nor to face the
embarrassment of an Arab defeat, as the
Soviets had to do in the 1956 and the 1967
Egyptian debacles.
The behavior of the Soviets in the
Jordanian crisis compared with the earlier
crises was even more noteworthy: one would
not have expected the hasty Soviet move "to
call off" the Syrians in 1970, given the
*In the context of the risk of a Soviet
confrontation with the US, the reaction of the US
would--as it has all along--determine the extent of
Soviet internal opposition. Thus, any indication that
US was not prepared to uphold the interests in the
area that it has identified and acted on in the past
would obviously mute those in the Soviet
policymaking circles concerned with the
consequences of such a confrontation.
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away from dependence solely on the Soviets
should this be found ultimately to be in the
UAR's best interests. (This is the path that
Sekou Toure of Guinea followed, and some
Soviet leaders have not forgotten.) The Sabry
affair is another reminder of how fragile
Soviet presence in the UAR may be. It also
illustrates a broader Soviet dilemma that aid
t o non-Communist regimes such as a
Nasser/Sadat-led UAR to satisfy a short run
requirement of using these regimes to expel
Western influence may strengthen them
against s u b s e q u e n t Soviet-instigated
subversion.
In addition to problems arising directly in
the UAR-Soviet context, other dilemmas are
posed by the volatility and complexity of the
Arab world rivalries which could also lead to
unwanted US-Soviet confrontation. Foremost
of these relates t o the Arab guerrilla
movement.
I n r e c e n t years, the Soviet press,
undoubtedly reflecting the views of some of
the top leadership, has attacked the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) and, by
implication, its leader, Arafat, for being
irresponsible and ineffective in advancing the
Arab cause. The Soviet leaders holding such a
negative view presumably believe that the
PLO's terrorist strategy against Israel might
trigger Israeli retaliation that could once more
escalate to an all-out Arab-Israeli conflict. The
latter, as in the case of the six-day war in
1967, could face the Soviets with the choice
of politically embarrassing abstention or of
direct military intervention in the Middle East
with all the risks implicit in such an action.
(By contrast, some Soviet leaders, like
Shelepin, have backed the PLO, presumably
because they feel that ideologically the
Soviets cannot afford to repudiate the PLO
and thus play into Chinese Communist
hands.)*
Again, undoubtedly reflecting some top
level concern, Soviet declarations have argued
for a political solution to the Arab-Israeli
c o n f l i c t , even though Nasser--in his
*For his pains on this as well as other scores,
Shelepin was removed from the top-level Party
Secretariat and assigned to the unimportant post of
head of the Soviet Trade Union Federation.

US N A V Y

The Soviet Navy Ship Moskva in the Mediterranean.
The Moskva has been described as a
"true multi-purpose" ship.

lifetime-and other Arab leaders in Syria,
Algeria, and Sudan have stated explicitly or
implicitly that the only solution to the
problem is the military defeat, if not
destruction, of Israel. It appears that some
Soviet leaders are concerned once more that if
this extreme Arab goal of "final solution" was
pursued in action, it would, given the fact
that the Israelis would fight to the death,
precipitate a dangerous situation, particularly
if the US intervened on Israel's side and faced
t h e Soviets with the choice between
politically damaging abstention or risky direct
military response to the US move.
Yet contrary to their desire to be at arm's
length from possible involvement in an
Arab-Israeli war, the Soviets have, since the
Jordanian crisis, increased this possibility by
the Soviet-UAR Treaty concluded this spring.
The treaty has the potential for deepening the
Soviets' quandary regarding Israel's relation to
the US, even as it seems to enhance their
political position in the short run. Thus, the
treaty will now make it even more difficult
41

companies to be invited back to help Guinea's
economy. Politically, the invitation frustrated
Soviet aims to acquire a monopoly position in
Guinea.

for the Soviets to stand aside in the event of
another Arab-Israeli war and a pending
Egyptian defeat.
At the same time, the Pact should not be
overrated as a factor for enhancing long-term
Soviet presence. The Soviets have in the past
concluded other seemingly binding long-term
agreements, only t o find them voided by
dilemmas accompanying the Soviet effort to
use these pacts as instruments for extending
influence or control abroad. One need only
recall the 1950 Sino-Soviet Pact which
pledged automatic involvement and all out
assistance by each party in case of attack by
Japan or its allies, and which some 10 years
later was dead as a doornail. This pact was
d e s t r o y e d precisely by the force of
nationalism that potentially can destroy the
seemingly close current ties between the UAR
and Soviet Union.
Indeed, the current Soviet-Egyptian Pact
has, from the Soviet viewpoint, a built-in
hedge of "mutual consultation" against
undesired "surprises." This gives the Soviets
an out for disowning any Egyptian action
because of "improper" consultation by the
UAR. This hedge, designed to give the Soviets
some leeway in the face of uncertainties in
the volatile Middle East, precisely symbolizes
the Soviets' perception of the dilemmas facing
them in the long run even as they try to
capitalize on the immediate opportunities and
benefits which the treaty seemingly bestows
on them.
In coming years, the dilemmas and
problems noted above are likely to undermine
Soviet influence and/or control in the Middle
East, with the result that a "backlash" against
the Soviets could see a return of the West on
much better political terms than earlier, i.e.,
to be invited voluntarily by the indigenous
states rather than to impose its will on the
area as it did earlier. A good example of such
a backlash is Guinea: originally the West, and
specifically the French, were expelled in late
1950's and the Soviets were invited in. The
Guineans soon discovered the inferior nature
of Soviet economic assistance and the ulterior
Soviet political aims designed to undermine
Sekou Toure's political base. The latter
resulted in the expulsion of the Soviet
ambassador and the former led the Western

SUMMARY

In sum, it can be said that the Soviet
penetration in the Middle East was initially
triggered by the tempting opportunity to
replace western (British and French) power,
which receded in the area after World War II.
However, now the Soviets are trapped in a
situation in which the choice of getting out or
of fully controlling the events in the area is
not available or has been severely narrowed.
At the same time, the dilemmas and problems
of continuing presence noted earlier are likely
to set in motion trends that will work against
the Soviet Union in the long run. These will
be fueled by Arab disillusionment with Soviet
"disinterest" (as the newness of Soviet
presence in the area wears off, as the Soviet
political designs become clearer, and as
Western colonialism recedes to a memory)
and by nationalism. These forces are likely to
undermine Soviet influence in the Middle East
a s they have elsewhere in both the
non-Communist and Communist world, e.g.,
Western Europe and Communist China.
In such a changing political context it can
be argued that the Soviets will be unable to
apply the Brezhnev doctrine in the Middle
East unless the US and the West permit it.
Indeed, the West must not only be militarily
strong enough to deter the Soviet Union from
using force to solve its problems and
dilemmas in the Middle East, but also must
offer a political alternative to Soviet
hegemony even if it cannot exclude Soviet
influence from the area. US and Western
interests might be better served, for that
matter, by not trying to exclude the Soviets
totally from the Middle East; rather, by their
involvement in the area, the Soviets should be
exposed to the same politically debilitating
process of erosion through Arab nationalism
as was the West. This might in turn induce,
with time, a constructive and cooperative
Soviet attitude which manifests itself by their
joining the West in helping the Middle East
solve its many problems for the benefit of all
parties concerned.
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